To my disappointment, Cuesta Morua repeats the same old arguments and stereotypes used by many to discredit the embargo and its supporters. It is disappointing because since Cuesta Morua belongs to the new generation of Cuban dissidents, you hope he would come up with more innovative arguments against the embargo. It is also disappointing because since Cuesta Morua lives in Cuba, you expect him to have a better grasp of all the nuances of exile/dissident politics.

I do not want to continue without an important clarification. I respect and admire Cuesta Morua. I respect him because--as I was not long ago--he is a peaceful, legitimate dissident opposing an all-powerful totalitarian state from within. I admire him because he is returning to Cuba after his visit here, something I did not do when faced with the same option. I consider this debate as just a minor disagreement between colleagues who agree on the most essential.

MAKING CONCESSIONS

What worries me the most in Cuesta Morua's article is that he feeds the stereotype of the ultraconservative-pro-embargo versus the moderate-anti-embargo. As all stereotypes, it is neither true nor fair. It is particularly unfair to the many exiles and dissidents who--like me for example--believe in dialogue, reconciliation, and also support the embargo. In fact, according to the last FIU Cuba Poll, most exiles believe in a combination of both strategies, where the embargo forces a post-Castro Cuban regime to sit with its opponents at the negotiating table.

Cuesta Morua says, "I will not presume here to speak for my colleagues in the dissident community..." Immediately after, however, he claims to "reflect the views of most in calling for an end to the embargo." Given the many constrains imposed by a totalitarian regime, there are no reliable means to gauge dissidents' opinions on any given subject. For me to affirm that most dissidents support the embargo would be inaccurate and irresponsible. It is equally inaccurate and irresponsible to affirm that most dissidents are against it.

Cuesta Morua asks where is the evidence showing the Cuban government can be forced toward a democratic opening by economic sanctions. There is little, but there is some. If Cubans today can freely use American dollars and profit from a few "paladares", they owe it exclusively to the U.S. embargo. In Castro's own words before the Cuban National Assembly in 1993, "...reality [read `the U.S. embargo'], forces us to do what we would have never done otherwise... make concessions". On the other hand, where is the evidence that "constructive engagement" will succeed where the embargo failed, China perhaps? Why don9t we ask the Canadians?

It is undeniable that the Cuban government uses the embargo for propaganda purposes. But to claim the embargo is "...a major obstacle to the peaceful transitional process we all want...", however, is a dangerous fallacy which contributes to the regime's propaganda efforts. No government can seriously refuse to meet with its opposition just because some foreign nation is not willing to trade with them. To put the blame on anyone else but Castro is to ignore reality. Regarding the regime's "defensive reaction" Cuesta Morua claims is caused by the embargo; Castro needs to call for internal discipline and ideological unity. That is the sine qua non of his regime; whether the embargo is lifted or not is irrelevant to him.

Which brings me to another of Cuesta Morua's statements, "Every time the United States announces some new sanction... the Cuban government responds with an internal crackdown." The last time the U.S. announced new sanctions against Cuba was in 1996, after the Cuban government's crackdown against Concilio Cubano and the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes. Up to this day, the Cuban government has continued its crackdown against dissidents--as well as its rhetoric against the United States--despite the fact that the Clinton Administration has relaxed quite a few areas of the embargo and made several attempts to improve relations.

The embargo will not topple Castro. Lifting the embargo will not topple Castro either, but it would constitute the final act to legitimize the corrupt, incompetent and cruel model Castro has imposed on the Cuban people. Furthermore, lifting the embargo would deprive the U.S. of any leverage to nudge a post-Castro government towards the serious economic and political reforms Cuba so desperately needs. Before irreversibly changing U.S. policy toward Cuba, we need to rethink our priorities carefully. Do we want Castroism without Castro in the short run, or a truly democratic, economically prosperous Cuba in the medium run? What we do today will significantly affect that outcome.