Copyright © 2007 Bruce W. Hauptli

I. Preface:

256 The question to be addressed is: "...Do we not think it is a matter of the utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be empirical and appropriate to anthropology?"

...a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be valid morally—that is, as a ground of obligation; that the command: `Thou shalt not lie’ could not apply to men, other rational beings having no obligation to abide by it….

-...the ground of obligation must be looked for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances in of the world in which he is placed, but a priori1solely in the concepts of pure reason....

56-257 A metaphysics of morals is thus indispensably necessary, not merely in order to investigate, from the motives of speculation, the source practical principles which are present a priori in our reason, but because morals themselves remain exposed to corruption of all sorts as long as this guiding thread is lacking....it is not enough that it which should conform to the moral law; it must also be done for the sake of the moral law….

-Why is a "metaphysic of morals" necessary? As we shall see, Kant contends that only a metaphysical foundation can ultimately secure a "pure" morality whose laws are "absolutely" necessary! Only a "metaphysic of morals" can explain the objective necessity of these laws, while allowing for their "subjective contingency."

II. Chapter I: Passage from Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morals to Philosophical:

A look at the overall structure of this work shows that we are about to begin "Chapter I. Passage from Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morals to Philosophical" [pp. 257-263].  Next we will encounter "Chapter II. Passage from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysic of Morals" [pp. 263-274].  Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals continues with a third Chapter: "Transition from the Metaphysics of Morals to the Critical Examination of Pure Practical Reason" which is not included in this selection.  In this progression we are obviously moving from "common sense morality" to the a priori metaphysical ground and nature of moral principles.  This progression, as Kant clearly states, does not constitute a move from empirical evidence to a theory which is based upon such evidence. 

This first Chapter is divided into a number of subparts.

A. The Good Will:

In these early sections, Kant clarifies what a "good will" is.

257 It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. 

-The sight of someone with talents and gifts of fortune but without a good will will never bring pleasure to an impartial observer. 

-258 Moderation, self-control, calm disposition, etc. are good only when accompanied by a good will (consider the coolness of a villain). 

258 Even if, by some special disfavor or destiny or by the niggardly endowment of a step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not, admittedly, a mere wish, but as a straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from this value." 

C. The Function of Reason:

Kant is a noted proponent of "pure" (or "speculative") reason, and in his The Critique of Pure Reason [1781/1787] he explains the role and importance of reason in this guise.  In this work, however, we are talking about practical reason—reason as it relates to action rather than to knowledge.  In this section Kant maintains that we have practical reason not to provide for survival, nor to provide for happiness, but, rather, to guide the will.  If either of the other two functions were to be the purpose of reason, we would be better served by relying upon the instincts. 

258 ...no organ is to be found for any end unless it is also the most appropriate to that end and best fitted for it.  Suppose now that for a being possessed of reason and a will the real purpose of nature were his preservation, his welfare, or in a word his happiness.  In that case nature would have hit on a very bad arrangement by choosing reason in the creature to carry out this purpose….instinct [would serve such functions far better]…. 

259 Reason's "…true function must be to produce a will which is good, not as a means to some further end, but in itself…" 

Kant will present us with three "propositions" (or principles) of morality.  In these sections he maintains that the good will must be understood by discussing duty—here the will is exposed to certain subjective limitations and obstacles which allow it to shine forth.  The good will will be one which is impelled by its duty.  That is, his "first proposition of morality is:

259 to have moral worth an action must be done from duty.

259 Acting in accordance with duty vs. acting from duty—inclinations must be avoided and the agent must be "impelled by his/her duty." 

-First Example (a duty to others): the grocer and not overcharging of inexperienced customer—if the "motivation" is selfishness, then it is not praiseworthy. 

-260 Second Example (a duty to oneself): maintaining one's life while suicidal—but only because it is a duty to do so.  The important thing is that one does one's duty because it is one's duty. 

--Note the extreme picture of these examples.  It is not that Kant wants the good will to manifest itself only in dreary contexts.  Instead, he recognizes that it is an impossible epistemological problem to try to determine whether a will is a good one—we cannot easily separate actions done from duty and those which are done from inclination (or where the two are both apply). T he only time we can be sure that the motivation of the will is duty is where all one's inclinations lead one in a radically different direction from that direction which is specified by our duty!  Rae Langton provides an excellent discussion of Kant's "extreme" examples.2 

-Third Example (another duty to others): beneficial acts and one so soured by circumstances that all sympathy is extinguished.  If the kind acts are still done from duty, the acts are right:

--Suppose then that the mind of this friend of man were overclouded by sorrows of his own which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of others, but that he still had power to help those in distress, though no longer stirred by the need of others because sufficiently occupied with his own; and suppose that, when no longer moved by any inclination, he tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the without any inclination for the sake of duty alone; then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth. 

-Fourth Example (another duty to oneself): the duty to assure one's happiness: the sufferer who preservers because of the duty to seek happiness. 

--He notes that the Biblical command to love one's neighbor appears odd—one can't command love—at least not "love out of inclination:" "For love out of inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty—although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way—practical love, and not pathological, love; residing in the will, and not in the propensities of feeling, in principles of action and not of melting compassion; and it is this practical love alone which can be an object of command." 

In this section Kant advances what he calls "the second proposition of morality: "that the moral worth of an action derives from its maxim and not from its consequences. 

261 An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon….the purposes we may have in our actions, and also their effects considered as ends and motives of the will, can give to actions no unconditioned and moral worth….Where, then, can this worth be found if we are not to find it in the will’s relation to the effect hoped for from the action? It can be found nowhere but in the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends which can be brought about by such an action; for between it’s a priori principle, which is formal, and it’s a posteriori motive, which is material, the will stands, so to speak, at a parting of the ways, and since it must be determined by some principle, it will have to be determined by a formal principle of action when an action is done from duty…. 

--Remember that we are here in the process of "transitioning" from the common sense morality to the philosophical—the argument is not yet one which is detached from examples and less rigorous reasoning.  The slack is to be taken up as the work progresses! 

In this section Kant maintains, thirdly, that duty is acting from respect (or "reverence") for the law. 

261 Only what is connected with my will as a principle (rather than as an inclination) can command respect—"duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law. 

-Only something which is conjoined with my will solely as a ground and never as an effect—something which does not serve my inclination, but outweighs it or at least leaves it entirely out of account in my choice—and therefore only bare law for its own sake, can be an object of reverence and therewith a command.  Now an action done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence of inclination, and along with inclination every object of the will; so there is nothing left to determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure reverence for this practical law, and therefore the maxim of obeying this law even to the detriment of all my inclinations. 

In this section Kant gives us the first statement of his fundamental moral principle—the summation of the three propositions of morality. 

261 Since I have robbed the will of every inducement that might arise for it as a consequence of obeying any particular law, nothing is left but the conformity of to universal law, and this alone must serve the will as its principle.  That is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should be a universal law. 

-262 May I make a promise with the intention not to keep it?  Such a maxim, when universalized, "would be bound to annul itself."   "Suppose I seek, however, to learn in the quickest way and yet unerringly how to solve the problem `Does a lying promise accord with duty?’  I have then to ask myself `Should I really be content that my maxim (the maxim of getting out of a difficulty of a false promise) should hold as a universal law (one valid both for myself and others)?  And could I really say to myself that every one may make a false promise if he finds himself in a difficulty from which he can extricate himself in no other way?’  I then become aware at once that I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a universal law of lying; for by such a law there could properly be no premises at all….  

--That is, the proposed maxim is contradictory—it would "annul itself" if universalized. 

While we don't yet understand the "metaphysical ground" of the categorical imperative at this point, he says: "…I do at least understand this much: reverence is the assessment of a which far outweighs all the worth of what is recommended by inclination, and the necessity for me to act out of pure reverence for the practical law constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give way because it is the condition of a will good in itself, whose value is above all else." 

Common sense reason (the practical faculty of judgment) recognizes the categorical imperative and needs no instruction here.  Theoretical reason (the theoretical faculty of judgment) is easily mislead—that is, philosophical speculation is difficult.  Wouldn't it be easier to remain within the practical sphere and settle for the case where ordinary individuals can have the knowledge which philosophers can have?  Kant doesn’t think so, indeed he believes we are led by a "natural dialectic" to try and understand here. 

III. Chapter II. Passage from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysic of Morals :

In this section Kant moves us from "common sense morality" toward a "metaphysics of morals," deepening our understanding of our duty, the categorical imperative, and the ground of both. This section does not take us all the way to the "metaphysical ground of morality," however—that awaits the "third section," which is not included in our selection.

A. The Use of Examples: The Impossibility of an Empirical Moral Philosophy:

263-264 So far we have derived our earlier concept of duty from the ordinary use of our practical reason, it must by no means to be inferred that we have treated it as a concept of experience. On the contrary, when we pay attention to our experience of human conduct, we meet frequent and—as we ourselves admit—justified complaints that we can adduce no certain examples of the spirit which acts out of pure duty, and that, although much may be done in accordance with the commands of duty, it remains doubtful whether it really is done for the sake of duty and so has moral value. Hence at all times there have been philosophers who have absolutely denied the presence of this spirit in human actions and have ascribed everything to more or less refined self-love.

-264 ...nothing can protect us against a complete falling away from our Ideas of duty, or can preserve in the soul a grounded reverence for its law, except the clear conviction that, even if there never have been actions springing from such pure sources, the question at issue here is not whether this or that has happened; that, on the contrary, reason by itself and independently of all appearances commands what ought to happen; that consequently actions of which the world has perhaps hitherto given no example—actions whose practicability might well be doubted by those who rest everything on experience—are nevertheless commanded unrelentingly by reason….

-…unless we wish to deny to the concept of morality all truth and all relation to a possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is of such widespread significance as to hold, not merely for all men, but for all rational beings as such—not merely subject to contingent conditions and exceptions, but with absolute necessity. It is therefore clear that no experience can give us occasion to infer even the possibility of such apodictic laws."3

--…we cannot do morality a worse service than by seeking to derive it from examples.

According to Kant many will settle for a "popular, practical (and empirical) moral philosophy" without trying to ground it in metaphysics:

265 It is certainly most praiseworthy to come down to the level of popular thought when we have previously risen to the principles of pure reason and are fully satisfied of our success. This could be described as first grounding moral philosophy on metaphysics and subsequently winning acceptance for it by giving it a popular character after it has been established. But it is utterly senseless to aim at popularity in our first enquiry, upon which the whole correctness of our principles depends.

266 All moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely a priori, and indeed in the most ordinary human reason just as much as in the most highly speculative: they cannot be abstracted from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent, knowledge. In this purity of their origin is to be found their very worthiness to serve as supreme practical principles.

- Thus we must advance "...from popular philosophy (which is here worthy of great respect) to metaphysics, which goes no further than it can get by fumbling about with the aid of examples, to metaphysics. (This no longer lets itself be held back by anything empirical, and indeed—since it must survey the complete totality of this kind of knowledge—goes right to Ideas, where examples themselves fail.) For this purpose we must follow and must portray in detail—the power of practical reason from the general rules determining it right up to the point where there springs from it the concept of duty.

--Criticism: in his Moral Knowledge, Alan Goldman maintains that: "if my spouse or children thought that I am moved to provide first for them primarily because I perceive this as the rational thing to do, they would be repelled by my peculiar psychology. We would dismiss any conception of rationality that did not hold these things reasonable to do; we are not guided by an independent conception of rationality or of a rational agent as such in wanting to do them. It is true that I am motivated to avoid doing what I consider irrational, but that is because clearly irrational behavior is normally counterproductive in my attempts to satisfy my first- and second-order desires, not because my deepest desire is to be a rational agent. (Indeed, I remain unsure that I have a concept of a rational agent apart from that of someone who tries efficiently to satisfy desires that humans ordinarily have.)"4

Here we are presented with a central paragraph for understanding Kant:

266 Everything in nature works according to laws.

Only rational beings may act according to conceptions of laws.

Reason is requisite for derivation of actions from laws.

If there was some creature whose reason necessarily determined the will, then this sort of creature would not distinguish those acts which are objectively necessary from those which are subjectively necessary!

266-267 We are not such creatures! The acts we recognize as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent.

-Without this distinction, in effect, we would not be dealing with morality according to him (here the notion of "freedom of the will" emerges!

267 Imperatives (that is `ought' statements) are formulas for objective principles which constrain our willing.

--All imperatives are expressed by an `ought’….By this they mark the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue of its subjective constitution….

--A perfectly good will [a "holy will"]...would…stand quite as much under objective laws (laws of the good), but it could not on this account be conceived as necessitated to act in conformity with law, since of itself, in accordance with its subjective constitution only, it can be determined only by the concept of the good.

267-268 Hypothetical Imperatives vs. Categorical Imperatives:
 

268 There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in all rational beings (so far as they are dependent beings to whom imperatives apply); and thus there is one purpose which they not only can have, but which we can assume with certainty that they all do have by a natural necessity—the purpose, namely, of happiness.

In this section, Kant raises the question "How are these different imperatives possible (what is their ground)?" He notes that we can understand the imperatives of skill and prudence easily, but those of morality are a different sort altogether, and the question as to how they are possible is most difficult.

268 How an imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion. Who wills the end, (so far as reason has decisive influence on his action) also wills the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power.

269 If it were only as easy to find a determinate concept of happiness, the imperatives of prudence would be equally analytic. For here as there it could alike be said "Who wills the end, wills also (necessarily, if he accords with reason) the sole means which are in his power.

-Unfortunately, we don't know what happiness is and, thus, this imperative is nearly empty ("...all the elements which belong to the concept of happiness are empirical...." and, thus, we "...cannot act according on determinate principles in order to be happy, but only on empirical counsels, for example, of diet, frugality, politeness, reserve, and so on—things which experience shows contribute most to well-being….imperatives of prudence, strictly speaking, do not command at all...cannot exhibit actions objectively as practically necessary, that they are rather to be taken as recommendations, than as commands...."

Beyond all doubt, the question "How is the imperative of morality possible?" is the only one in need of a solution; for it is in no way hypothetical, and consequently we cannot base the objective necessity which it affirms on any presupposition….

270 The possibility of the [categorical] imperative of morality, then, will have to be established completely a priori.

In addition, he adds, this imperative can not be true analytically and necessarily, since it is to be an imperative of practical reason. Thus, it must be a synthetical a priori proposition! Such propositions are characterized by "transcendental" (rather than "logical") necessity—that is to say, if we are to have the character, experience, and knowledge that we do, these propositions and judgments are necessary.

-What are such propositions like? Consider "everything in space is in time"—is it analytic? Is it "necessarily" true?

-As Laurence BonJour notes, "the term `synthetic' was of course originally introduced by Kant merely as the complement of `analytic', and thus ought to mean nothing more than "not analytic"; in the original Kantian usage, a synthetic proposition is one whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept."5

-In his A History of Western Philosophy: Philosophy From the Renaissance to the Romantic Age, A. Robert Caponigri offers the following useful characterization of Kant's "critical" orientation in metaphysics and epistemology:

the critical problem has at its base the desire of Kant to evade...scepticism, by raising and resolving the basic issue: how is it possible for objects to correspond to the concepts of the understanding. This is equivalent to the question, how are the philosophical disciplines, that is, sciences which reach their objects independently of experience of the senses, possible….
  The formal statement of the problem is made by Kant...in terms of the logic of propositions. The typical statement of the sciences which proceed by analysis is an analytical proposition. The character of such propositions is that all that is explicated in the predicate is already contained implicitly in the concept of the subject....Synthetic propositions are those in which the predicates affirmed of the subject are not to be discovered by analysis of its concept. Such synthetic propositions would, according to the prevailing view, have all to be derived from experience and have a value as knowledge which is wholly a function of experience.
  We are confronted, therefore, Kant believes, by the unhappy alternative of believing that there are sciences of experience, which proceed by a method of synthesis "a posteriori," which have genuine objects in experience and which are dynamic and expansive in that they are always open to the novelty of the content of experience, but which can never have that character of universality and necessity which is the classical attribute of science. On the other hand, there are sciences which proceed by a method of "a priori" analysis, which have, indeed, an indisputable character of universality and necessity within the limits of their terms and methods, but which have no objects in the order of existence.
  Consequently, between the wings of these alternatives, Kant introduces a third possibility which alone, he believes, could correspond to the concept of science. That is to say, an order of sciences which should indeed proceed by a method "a priori," but by a method at the same time synthetic, a method which would, consequently, assure them both of universality and necessity, and at the same time, of an order of objects in existence and a dynamism which is the quality of existence itself. 
  Such sciences, consequently, would consist of propositions, in their positive aspects, which would be neither analytical "a priori" nor synthetical "a posteriori," but rather synthetic a priori. The most formal way, consequently, in which this critical problem cam be put is this: how are propositions synthetical a priori possible?6

There is only one categorical imperative:

270 Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.

-In talking about what this imperative commands, we need to distinguish the cases of "perfect" and "imperfect" duties: the former are absolutely required actions wherein there is no "free play" for personal discretion or variation regarding how or when to perform the actions; while the latter require action, at least at times, from individuals but leave open to the individual the choice of actions to fulfill the goals.

Illustrations:

1. The tragic suicide case.

-Contradiction in the maxim.

271 2. Borrowing money with a lying promise case.

-Contradiction in the maxim.

3. The reluctant talent development case.

-Contradiction in the attempt to will the maxim.

4. The unconcerned benevolence case.

-Contradiction in the attempt to will the maxim.

-Michael Bayles and Ken Henley maintain that "a maxim that proposes a violation of perfect duty cannot be universalized, for the state of affairs in which it would be universally adopted cannot be consistently described."7 "A maxim that proposes a violation of imperfect duty cannot be universalized, for although its universal adoption can be consistently described, the agent cannot will such universal adoption without a conflict."8 

The Canon of Moral Judgment:

"We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should become, a universal law—that is the general canon for all moral judgement of action. Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be conceived as a universal law of nature without contradiction, let alone be willed as what ought to become one. In the case of others we do not find this inner impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself."

271-272 In this section Kant also explains how we go wrong morally: when we transgress against duty we don't will that our maxim be a universal law, instead we make an exception for ourselves! 

-...if we weighed it all up from one and the same point of view—that of reason—we should find a contradiction in our own will, the contradiction that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet subjectively does not hold universally but should admit of exceptions. Since, however, we first consider our action from the point of view of a will wholly in accord with reason, and then consider precisely the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclinations, there is here actually no contradiction, but rather an opposition of inclination to the precept of reason….This procedure, though in our own impartial judgement it cannot be justified, proves none the less that we in fact recognize the validity of the categorical imperative….

In this section Kant notes that we are after fundamental moral principles, and they can not come out of merely contingent facts: reason alone can dictate them!

272-273 ...everything that is empirical is, as a contribution to the principle of morality, not only wholly unsuitable, for the purpose, but is even highly injurious to the purity of morals.; for in morals the proper worth of an absolutely good will, a worth elevated above all price, lies precisely in this—that the principle of action is free from all influence by contingent grounds….

-273 Thus we will have to take up the (pure) metaphysics of morals—we will have to precind from all that is empirical: "our question therefore is this: `Is it a necessary law for all rational beings always to judge their actions by reference to those maxims of which they themselves can themselves will that they should serve as universal laws?’ If there is such a law, it must already be connected (entirely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being as such. But in order to discover this connexion we must, however much we may bristle, take a step beyond it—that is into metaphysics, although into a region of it different from that of speculative philosophy, namely, the metaphysics of morals. In a practical philosophy we are not concerned with accepting reasons for what happens, but with accepting laws of what ought to happen, even if it may never does happen—that is, objective practical laws)."

--Criticism: in her "The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality," Nancy Sherman maintains that: "beneficence is not a moral principle for angels, but for human beings whose rational capacities happen to be finite and who therefore need the collaborative assistance and resources of others. A maxim that seeks to gain self-advantage by denying mutual aid is incoherent in the universalized world of that maxim only because the agent of such a maxim will be denied what she needs for effective human willing. It is because of our human condition that a policy of mutual disinterest is impermissible, and its opposite, beneficence, morally required. Put differently, dependence is a contingent matter for us, and the obligation to be beneficent requires appeal to that empirical premise. We contradict our wills by a maxim of nonbeneficence insofar as we deny a standing fact about our wills....the other substantive human virtues and the categorical imperatives that correspond to them are similarly justified by appeal to certain empirical facts. But if this is the case, then not only how we express what we are morally required to do is contingent upon our constitutions, but equally, what we are morally required to do. That is, substantive moral principles or ends depend upon empirical facts."9

In this section Kant offers the second of his three formulations of the categorical imperative. The first was "act according to that maxim which one may will should be a universal law." This second formulation deepens our understanding of the relationship of the categorical imperative to reason. Kant notes that only rational beings are able to determine their wills in accord with conceptions of laws. In cases where we are dealing with objective (rather than subjective) purposes, the will must be determined by reasons which would be accepted by all rational agents. That is, if we are dealing with actions which serve merely relative purposes, we will get only hypothetical imperatives. To get a categorical imperative, one must

273 "...suppose…there were something whose existence has in itself absolute value, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative—that is of a practical law.

Now, I say, that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrarily use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end."

-274 Persons, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence as an object of our actions has a value for us; they are objective ends—that is, things whose existence is in itself an end, and indeed an end such that in its place we can put no other end to which they should serve simply as means; for unless this is so, nothing at all of absolute value would be found anywhere….

If then there is to be a supreme practical principle—so far as human will is concerned—a categorical imperative, it must be one such that from the idea of something, which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an end in itself it forms an objective principle of the will and consequently can serve as a practical law. The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence: it is therefore so far a subjective principle of human actions. But it is also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existence on the same rational ground which is valid also for me, hence it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as the supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws for the will. The practical imperative will therefore be as follows: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end..

Illustrations:

1. The tragic suicide case.

-Treats oneself as a means only.

2. Borrowing money with a promise case.

-Treats others as means only.

3. The reluctant talent development case.

-Treating humanity--in the "body" of the self—as means only (tending only to the maintenance of humanity and not to its promotion/development). 

4. The unconcerned benevolence case.

-Treating humanity in general as a means only rather than as an end.

Kant goes on to provide a yet "deeper" formulation of his categorical imperative, tracing it as fully as he can within the "metaphysics of morals" to its metaphysical grounding. He holds that objectively the ground of all practical reason lies in the universality of its laws, while subjectively the ground must lie in the end. Since the real subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself; he is lead to his third version of the Categorical Imperative:

the view that each good will functions at the same time as a "moral legislator" and a "moral subject"—willing laws which apply both to him or herself and to all other rational agents. They are subjects in a kingdom of ends.

Criticism: in his "Trust, Affirmation, and Moral Character: A Critique of Kantian Morality," Laurence Thomas offers the following critique of Kantian ethics: "...wholly rational moral selves do not need one another for moral support and affirmation. Since all are metaphysically constituted so that of necessity they act in accordance with the moral law, there can be no sense in which their moral endeavors sustain one another. Indeed, if their moral endeavors did, then they could not be members of the kingdom of ends, since in that case they would not be acting for (and only for) the sake of the moral law. With wholly rational moral selves we have absolute autonomy, but we lack moral community.
  I cannot see why human beings should embrace this moral ideal. For it is an ideal that tells us that human life at its very best nevertheless misses the moral mark. The good life, if only we could achieve it, is one where individuals are mutually supportive of one another and trust abounds, where individuals find strength in one another's moral victories and learn from one another's moral shortcomings, and where in general the biological capacity for love...and the good will anchored in it give morality a foothold in our lives that it would not otherwise have. I can see nothing frail or imperfect in life thus lived. Nor can I see that we should want to think of life thus lived as at best a limited expression of what living morality is all about."10

Criticism: in his "A Critique of Kantianism," Richard Taylor maintains that: "Kant peoples a veritable utopia, which he of course does not imagine as existing, with these Ends in Themselves, and calls it the Kingdom of Ends. Ends in Themselves are, thus, not to be thought of as those men that live and toil on the earth; them are not suffering, rejoicing, fumbling, living, and dying human beings; they are not men that anyone has ever seen, or would be apt to recognize as men if they did see them, or apt to like very much is he did recognize them. They are abstract things, reifications of Rational nature, fabricated by Kant and now called Rational Beings or Ends in Themselves. Their purpose, unlike that of any creature under the sun, is not to sorrow and rejoice, not to love and hate, not to beget offspring, not to grow old and die, and not to get on as best they can to such destinies as the world has allotted them. Their purpose is just to legislate—to legislate morally and rationally for this rational Kingdom of Ends."11

As he sees it, we can not to think of yourself except as free! Our very conception of us as agents and of ourselves as engaging in actions on the basis of choice requires us to posit what we can not prove—that we are free. It is the only way for us to account for the obvious phenomenon of human action. Thus he says, employing a transcendental argument, we must take it that we are free. In his "We Can Act Only Under the Idea of Freedom," Henry Allison maintains that: "...freedom is not simply a property that we may attribute to ourselves as rational agents on heuristic grounds; it is rather the defining feature of this very conception."12

     For Kant, two additional “postulates” or “presuppositions of morality” are also established via transcendental arguments: immortality and a deity.  In our text these “postulates” are discussed in a selection from his Critique of Practical Reason [1788] entitled “God and Immortality As Necessary Postulates of Morality.”  In his introduction to the selection, Louis Pojman says:

580 “immortality is necessary in this way: We are commanded by the moral law to be morally perfect.  Since `ought’ implies `can’, we must be able to reach moral perfection.  But we cannot attain perfection in this life, for the task is an infinite one.  So there must be an afterlife in which we continue to make progress toward this ideal.
  God is a necessary postulate in that there must be someone to enforce the moral law.  That is, to be completely justified the moral law must result in a just distribution of happiness in accordance with virtue.  The good must be rewarded by happiness in proportion to their virtue, and the evil in proportion to their vice.”13  

I think his gloss on the arguments here, and the selection from Kant help us understand what such transcendental arguments are to be like, and I recommend this as additional reading for you.

IV. Summary:

1. Why a "metaphysic" of morals is necessary:

only such a foundation can provide moral laws which are absolutely necessary. Empirical (anthropological) studies will give us only contingently binding obligations.

What would a "metaphysic of women's basketball championship game" mean? Women, teams, competition, organization(s), spectators, reporters, coverage, etc., all would have to be for the game to be.

Provide an a priori ground for the supreme principle of morality. A ground which would be objectively necessary, subjectively contingent, but compelling to a rational agent.

Provide something which was not simply a contingent, but rather, an absolute end.

Three propositions of morality:

-The good will must be understood by discussing duty--it is a will which is impelled by its duty. (p. 259)

-The moral worth of an action is determined by its maxim (not from its consequences). (p. 261)

-Duty is the necessity of acting from reverence for the law. (p. 261)

These, in turn, are summarized as the Categorical Imperative: -"...never act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law." (p. 270)

-What makes a maxim "bad?" Contradiction (of maxim, or of willing the maxim). 

Categorical vs. hypothetical imperatives: -Objective and subjective necessity,

-Holy wills,

-First Formulation: [p. 270] act only on maxim which can be consistently universalized,

-Four illustrations,

-Second Formulation: [p. 273] humanity as an end-in-itself rather than as a means only,

-Four illustrations,

-Third Formulation; [not in text] universally legislative will,

-Heteronomy and autonomy,

-The kingdom of ends,

Try to think of yourself as not free!

The presupposition of freedom.

1 A proposition is a priori if it can be known (or justified) independently of sensory experience.  That is, if it can be known (or justified) through reason once its constituents are understood.  An argument is an a priori one if all of its premises are a priori.  Back

2 Cf., Rae Langton, "Duty and Desolation," Philosophy v. 67 (1992), pp. 481-505.  Back

3 That is laws which are demonstrable and indisputable.  Back

4 Alan Goldman, Moral Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1988), p.107.  Back

5 Cf., Laurence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1998), p. 65.  Back

6  Cf., A. Robert Caponigri, A History of Western Philosophy: Philosophy From the Renaissance to the Romantic Age (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame, 1963), p. 449-450.  Back

7 Michael Bayles and Kenneth Henley, "Kant and Contractarianism," in Right Conduct: Theories and Applications, eds. M. Bayles and K. Henley (N.Y.: Random House, 1989), pp. 58-69, p. 62.   Back

8 Ibid., p. 63.  Back

9 Nancy Sherman, "The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality," in Identity, Character, and Morality, eds. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 149-170, p. 167.  Emphasis added to the passage.  Back

10 Laurence Thomas, "Trust, Affirmation, and Moral Character: A Critique of Kantian Morality," in Identity, Character, and Morality, op. cit., pp. 235-257, pp. 254-255.  Back

11 Richard Taylor, "A Critique of Kantianism," in Right and Wrong Basic Readings in Ethics, ed. Christina Hoff Sommers (San Diego: Harcourt, 1986), pp. 62-69, p. 67.  The essay originally appeared in Taylor's Good and Evil (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1970).  Cf., Richard Taylor’s “Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong [1970], in Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings (fifth edition) (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2007), pp. 148-154.  This selection also appeared in Taylor’s Good and Evil  (go to that lecture supplement).  Back

12 Henry Allison, "We Can Act Only Under the Idea of Freedom," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association v. 71 (1997), pp. 39-50, p. 42.  Back

13 Louis Pojman, “Introduction” to Kant’s “God and Immortality As Necessary Postulates of Morality,” a selection from his Critique of Practical Reason [1788], trans. T.K. Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, 1873), in Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings (fifth edition) (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2007), p. 580.  Back 

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File revised on: 03/13/2007.