PHI 3300 Spring 2009 Dr. Hauptli Sample Final Exam Questions
Copyright © 2009 Bruce W. Hauptli
The following sample questions are examples of the kinds of questions I will be asking. The list is far longer than a reasonable examination could be, and I will ask between two and three such questions on the examination itself. You will be asked to be as complete as you can in writing essays in answer such questions. While there is no “length requirement” for the examination, the questions and exam will be designed so that the average student in this class should need to spend most of the allowed time actively writing. Short answers are unlikely to be sufficiently detailed to earn high grades, and mere outlines or lists (of terms, principles, theories, etc.) do not provide sufficient explanation—they will not convince me that you understand the relevant material. As the questions clearly indicate, I expect you to explain specific points in answering the questions, and an essay which does not address these points is inadequate. The exam will be a closed-book, closed-notes exam, and you will not be allowed to consult dictionaries or other reference texts. The exam will be on Thursday, April 23 from 5:30-6:45 in our regular classroom.
1. Explain what William Alston means by “epistemic circularity.” In answering this question clarify what it is, why it he calls it “circular,” and why such circularity is deemed to be a bad thing by Alston. Give an example of this sort of circularity.
2. What does Alston mean by “SP.” What it this practice, what kind of practice is it, what is it supposed to produce, and how is it relevant to “knowledge?”
3. What does Alston mean by a “track record argument” for the reliability of SP. In answering this question clarify what such a justification would look like, and how it runs afoul of the problem of epistemic circularity.
4. What does Alston think is wrong with an argument for the reliability of SP which appeals to our record of successful predictions resulting from employing SP as it “validates” the SP practice?
5. Alston embraces elements of both the externalist and the internalist epistemological orientation. Discuss the following passage as you clarify his externalist and internalist tendencies:
SP must be reliable if I am to be justified in holding perceptual beliefs, but I don’t have to be justified in supposing this to be the case. But then if SP is reliable, I can use various (justified) perceptual beliefs to show that SP is reliable, for I need not already be justified in holding the conclusion in order to be justified in holding the premises. The argument would still be epistemically circular, for I am still assuming in practice the reliability of SP in forming normal perceptual beliefs. Nevertheless, I don’t have to be justified in making the assumption, in order to be justified in the perceptual beliefs that give my premises. Hence the epistemic circularity does not prevent justification from being transmitted from the premises to a conclusion that would have been unjustified except for this argument….
But even if I am right about this and it is possible to establish the reliability of sense perception and other basic sources of belief by simple track record arguments, these arguments still do not satisfy the usual aspirations of those seeking to determine whether a basic doxastic practice like SP is reliable….the argument will not do its job unless we are justified in accepting its premises; and that is the case only if sense perception is in fact reliable. This is to offer a stone instead of bread. [Alston’s The Reliability of Sense Perception, pp. pp. 16-17].
In answering this question clarify the elements of this passage which are most compatible with the externalist perspective and which with the internalist perspective. Which side do you think Alston ultimately comes down upon?
6. Why does Alston believe a priori arguments for the reliability of SP could be superior to the track record argument, and what problem do the a priori arguments ultimately run afoul of (and why). Discuss one of the following such arguments as you clarify your answer to this question: the “theological argument,” the “verificationists’ argument,” or the “criterion-based argument.”
7. What is the “Private Language Argument,” how could it be used to argue for the reliability of SP, and why does Alston believe this sort of argument is unsuccessful?
8. What is a “transcendental argument,” how might such arguments be used to argue for the reliability of SP, and why does Alston believe this sort of argument is unsuccessful?
9. How might an “introspective argument” for the reliability of SP go; how it supposed to be different from the “track record,” “a priori,” and “transcendental” arguments; what does such an argument appeal to; and why does Alston believe such arguments are not successful?
10. Clarify how arguments involving “inference to the best explanation” might be used to try and justify the reliability of SP. In answering this question, indicate what problem Alston believes undercuts such arguments.
11. What is wrong with arguments from our “predictive success” (our success on predicting the course of our future experience) being used to try and establish the reliability of SP according to William Alston?
12. Does Alston believe that it is only SP which is subject to the problem of epistemic circularity? In addressing this question, discuss memory and inductive inference.
13. Clarify Alston’s “practical argument for the rationality of SP” and how it is to be used to argue for the reliability of SP. In answering this question, clarify how the prima facie rationality of SP is established by him, and how this rationality bears on the question of the reliability of SP.
14. Why does Alston believe we should follow Thomas Reid in treating our basic doxastic practices as “innocent until proven guilty?”
15. On p. 131 Alston maintains that: “…I believe that in showing it to be rational to engage in SP, I have thereby, not shown SP to be reliable, but shown it to be rational to suppose SP to be reliable.” Clarify what he is claiming here, and how he believes this addresses the core concern of the book.
16. On p. 133 Alston maintains that: “if, as I have argued, we are unable to find noncircular indications of the truth of the reliability judgment, it is certainly relevant to show that it enjoys some other kind of rationality. It is, after all, not irrelevant to our basic aim at believing the true and abstaining from believing the false, that SP and other established doxastic practices constitute the most reasonable procedures to use, so far as we can judge, when trying to realize that aim.” Clarify what he is claiming here, and how he believes this addresses the core concern of the book.
File revised on 04/15/2009.